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SUBROGATION: PROPER PARTY PLAINTIFF IN ACTION
AGAINST TORT-FEASOR
INTRODUCTION
"Subrogation" is the substitution of one person in place of an-
other who possesses a rightful claim, so that the person substituted
succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the claim.
1 The
doctrine of subrogation has its origin in the general principles of
equity, and should be applied in accordance with the dictates of
equity and good conscience.2 Justice Cothran, writing the opinion
in the South Carolina case of Dunn v. Chapinan,3 stated the four
elements which must be met before the right of subrogation is gained:
(1) that the party claiming it has paid the debt; (2) that he
was not a volunteer, but had a direct interest in the discharge
of the debt or lien; (3) that he was secondarily liable for the
debt or for the discharge of the lien.; (4) that no injustice will
be done to the other party by the allowance of the equity.
With reference to insurers, the general rule is that on payment
of a loss covered by insurance, the insurer is subrogated to all the
rights which the insured would have against any other person respon-
sible for the loss, whether or not such right of subrogation was stipu-
lated in the contract. 4 It is not necessary that the insurance company
specifically reserve the right of subrogation within the insurance
policy, but most policies will be found to contain such a provision.
5
Subrogation is peculiar to contracts of indemnity, such as fire and
theft, and liability insurance as distinguished from life insurance.
When the insurer has complied with all of the elements of subroga-
tion, the question as to who should bring an action against the tort-
feasor becomes one of major importance.
RuLe AT CommoN LAW
When an insurer has paid to the insured the amount required by
the policy, and has thereby become subrogated to the rights of the
1. BLAcies LAW DIcTIoNARY 1595 (4th ed. 1951).
2. Prudential Investment Co. v. Connor, 120 S.C. 42, 112 S.E. 539 (1920).
3. 149 S.C. 163, 170, 146 S.E. 818 (1928).
4. Pelzer Manuf. Co. v. Sun Fire Office, 36 S.C. 213, 15 S.E. 562 (1891).
5. Typical of such provisions are lines 162 to 165 of the 1948 New York
Standard Fire Policy which reads: "Subrogation -This company may re-
quire from the insured an assignment of all right of recovery against any party
for loss to the extent that payment therefor is made by this company."
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insured against the person or corporation by whose tortious act the
loss has been caused, the proper mode of enforcing such right of
subrogation, would, at common law, be by an action in the name of
the insured for the benefit of such insurance company.6 Thus, when
property was destroyed by a fire caused by the negligent emission of
sparks from a locomotive, it was held that even after the insurer
had indemnified the insured and become subrogated to his rights, the
proper party plaintiff in an action against the tort-feasor, was the
insured. 7 The rule that actions against the tort-feasor must be
brought in the name of the insured may be explained by at least
two theories. One theory is that since the wrongful act was single
and indivisible, it gave rise to but one liability which must be en-
forced in a single action.8 Another theory is that where there is
an injury to property, the proper party plaintiff was the holder of
the strict legal title. The common law did not recognize the bene-
ficial or equitable interest of the subrogee. 9 The right of action
remained in the insured whether or not the insured had been fully
paid for his loss or the loss exceeded the insurance carried.1 0
When the insurer has become subrogated to the rights of the in-
sured by payment of the loss, the insured becomes a trustee of the
insurer to the extent of the payment and is bound to assign to the
insurer the claim against the tort-feasor; if the insured fails to do
so, the insurer as cestui que trust, may sue in the name of the insured
as trustee.11
UNDER REAL PARTY IN INTEREST STATUTES: WHERE Loss
DoEs NOT EXCEED INSURANCE PAID
One of the prime motives that prompted the various states to
include "Real Party in Interest" statutes in their codes was the
6. Mobile Ins. Co. v. Columbia and G. Ry. Co., 41 S.C. 408, 22 S.E. 414,
44 Am. St. Rep. 725 (1894).
7. Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Oregon Ry. and Nay. Co., 20 Or. 569, 26 Pac.
857,23 Am. St. Rep. 151 (1891).
8. Hanton v. New Orleans and C. R. Light and P. Co., 124 La. 562, 50 So.
544 (1909) ; Kansas City M. and 0. Ry. Co. v. Shutt, 24 Okla. 96, 104 Pac.
51, 138 Am. St. Rep. 870, 20 Ann. Cas. 255 (1909).
9. Mobile Ins. Co. v. Columbia and G. Ry. Co., 41 S.C. 408, 22 S.E. 414,
44 Am. St. Rep. 725 (1894); Pittsburgh C. C. and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Home
Ins. Co., 183 Ind. 355, 108 N.E. 525 (1915).
10. Long v. Kansas City M. and 0. Ry. Co., 170 Ala. 635, 54 So. 62 (1910);
Anderson v. Miller, 96 Tenn. 35, 33 S.W. 615, 31 L.R.A. 604, 54 Am. St.
Rep, 812 (1896) stated that the fact that the insured had been fully paid by
the insurer was no defense to a tort-feasor in action by insured; Louisville
and N. Ry. Co. v. Morse, 143 Ga. App. 110, 84 S.E. 428 (1915) held that the
action should be by the insured for the use and benefit of the insurer.
11. Mobile Ins. Co. v. Columbia G. Ry. Co., 41 S.C. 408, 22 S.E. 414, 44
Am. St. Rep. 725 (1894); Sullivan et ux. v. Naiman et al., 130 N.J.L. 278,
32 A. 2d 589 (1943).
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desire to abolish the common law rule which recognized as plain-
tiff only the person whose legal right had been infringed upon by
the defendant. With the adoption of Real Party in Interest sta-
tutes, the equity rule which allowed the party with the beneficial
interest to sue, became the prevailing law.12 In Globe and Rutgers
Fire Ins. Co. v. Foil,13 where insurance paid covered the whole loss,
Mr. Justice Fishburne stated:
An action may be brought by the insurer against the third party
causing the loss without taking an assignment of the owners
claim or being formally subrogated to his rights; and it is im-
material whether such right of subrogation was stipulated in the
contract or not.
In the leading North Carolina case of Cunningham v. S.A.L. Ry.
Co.,' 4 it was held that when the insured had been paid in full for
the loss sustained, he could not sue the tort-feasor since he was
not the real party in interest. This probably is the majority view
and appears to rest upon the theory that when the insured has
been paid the full amount of his loss, he no longer retains any
interest in the cause of action and is therefore not a necessary party.
In the South Carolina case of Lucas v. Garret,15 even though the
insured had been fully covered by insurance, he was allowed to
bring the action against the tort-feasor as trustee for the use and
benefit of the insurer. The suit was brought with the consent of
the insurer. This method is permitted in several other jurisdictions.
But this appears to be the only South Carolina case to allow such
an action. The reasoning followed in one such case was stated by
the court:
It is really no concern of the tort-feasor in whose name the
action is brought, just so he will not be compelled to pay twice
for the same loss.
t7
Where the insured has been completely indemnified, the insurer may
12. Clark and Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 YALE L. J. 259
(1925) wherein it-was said: "The aim of the codifiers was a unified system of
law and equity."
13. 189 S.C. 91, 99, 200 S.E. 97 (1938).
14. 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E. 1029 (1905).
15. 208 S.C. 292, 38 S.E. 2d 18 (lst Appeal); 209 S.C. 521, 41 S.E. 2d 212,
169 A.L.R. 660 (1947).
16. Cushman and Rankin Co. v. Boston and M. R. Ry. Co., 82 Vt. 309, 72
Atl. 1073, 18 Ann. Cas. 708 (1909); Humve v. McGinnis, 156 Kan. 300, 133
P. 2d 162 (1943).
17. Humve v. McGinnis, 156 Kan. 300, 133 P. 2d 162 (1943).
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bring the action against the tort-feasor, and it is not necessary that
he join any other, for he has the beneficial interest. 8
Insurance companies which were bringing suits against the tort-
feasor in their own names often found that juries were unduly sympa-
thetic with the defendant and accordingly rendered small verdicts
or none at all. 19 As a result of this treatment it became a common
practice among insurers to advance to the insured his loss on the
signing of an agreement to repay from proceeds of recovery from
the tort-feasor.20 This device is called a "loan receipt." 2' Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis, writing an opinion upholding the validity of such an
agreement, stated:
It is credible to the ingenuity of business men that an arrange-
ment should have been devised which is consonant both with the
needs of commerce and the demands of justice.
22
In a recent South Carolina case in which the insured had been
"loaned" the amount of its loss in an automobile accident and was
bringing an action against the company responsible for the loss, it
was held that the defendant could not have the insurer joined with
plaintiff as a necessary party.2 3 The defendant, in an action for
injury to property, cannot introduce evidence at trial that the plain-
tiff has been compensated in part or in whole for his loss by insur-
ance, if his answer did not raise the point that the action was not
prosecuted by the real party in interest.2
UNDER REAL PARTY IN INTEREST STATUTE: WHERE Loss
EXCEEDS INSURANCE PAID
The general rule, which is adhered to in South Carolina, is stated
to be:
Under statutes providing that every action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest, it is generally held
18. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Charleston and W. C. Ry. Co., 76 S.C. 101, 56 S.E.
788 (1906).
19. 2 RicHAuDS, INSURANct 694 (5th ed. 1952). "
20. Phillips v. Clifton Manuf. Co., 204 S.C. 496, 30 S.E. 2d 146 (1944);
See 6 S.C.L.Q. 112 (1953).
21. 'A loan receipt is a device which permits insurers to speedily pay in-
sured and yet press in court to recoup its losses from wrongdoer without insurer
appearing by name, thereby avoiding some of the consequences of subroga-
tion." Merrimack Manuf. Co. v. Lowell Trucking Corp., 46 N.Y. 2d 736,
182 Misc. 947 (1944).
22, Luchenback v. N. J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co., 248 U.S. 139, 39 S. Ct. 53,
63 L. Ed. 170, 1 A.L.R. 1522 (1918). Quoted with approval in Phillips v. Clifton
Manuf. Co., 204 S.C. 496, 30 S.E. 2d 146 (1944).
23. Phillips v. Clifton Manuf. Co., 204 S. C. 496, 30 S.E. 2d 146 (1944).
24. Brown v. Smith, 210 S.C. 405, 42 S.E. 2d 883 (1947) ; Jeffords v. Florence
County, 165 S.C. 15, 162 S.E. 574 (1932).
[Vol. 7
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that if the insurance paid by an insurer covers only a portion
of the loss, . . . the right of action against the wrongdoer who
caused the loss remains in the insured for the entire loss, and
the action must be brought by him in his own name.
25
The reason for this rule has been declared by the South Carolina
Supreme Court to rest upon the theory that the cause of action
should not be split so that the defendant will be compelled to de-
fend two actions for the same tort.26 The position taken by South
Carolina has not met with complete approval. One text writer
questions the propriety of allowing the insured to maintain the ac-
tion alone and seems to feel that the action should be brought by
either the insured or insurer, on the joining of the other as plain-
tiff or defendant.
2 7
In Pringle v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co.,28 the insured received
partial compensation for his loss from his insurance carrier and
then brought an action in his own name against the tort-feasor.
The tort-feasor asserted by way of defense that the insured was not
the proper party plaintiff, but rather the insurer was. The court,
holding that the insurance company was not a necessary party, said:
The right of an insurance company to proceed in its own name
is a right which it alone can assert, and which cannot be asserted
by the defendant tort-feasor.
Decisions are found that allow the insurer to bring the action in his
own name even though the loss exceeds the insurance paid, but such
cases allow this only where the insurer has paid part of the loss
and the wrongdoer has paid the balance; then the insurer may main-
tain an action for the amount of his payment in his own name and
for his own benefit against the tort-feasor.
2 9
If the insured institutes an action against the tort-feasor to re-
cover the difference between the amount paid by the insurer and
the amount of the loss, the insurer should assert its claim to subro-
gation by a motion to be made a party and to have the complaint
amended to state a cause of action in its favor.3 0 Another method
25. 29 Am. JuR. 1016, approved in Pringle v. A.C.L. Ry. Co., 212 S.C. 303,
47 S.E. 2d 722 (1948).
26. Pringle v. A.C.L. Ry. Co., 212 S.C. 303, 47 S.E. 2d 722 (1948).
27. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 177 (2d ed. 1947).
28. 212 S.C. 303, 47 S.E. 2d 722 (1948).
29. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Charleston and W. C. Ry. Co., 76 S.C. 101, 56 S.E.
788 (1907); Powell and Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E.
426, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 1302 (1916).
30. Ex parte Insurance Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 86 S.C. 52, 68 S.E. 21
(1910). However, if the insurer fails to make such a motion it seems that he
19551
5
Powell: The Degree of Privilege Afforded the Press in South Carolina in P
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTEIRLY
of bringing the action when the loss exceeds the amount of insur-
ance paid is to allow the insurer and the insured to join together
as party plaintiffs.3 ' In Farmers Mercantile Co. v. S.A.L. Ry. Co.,
2
three insurance companies paid a total of $4,000, the amount of
their policies, to the insured who sustained a $6,500 loss. It was
held that the insurers were properly joined with the insured in a
suit against the wrongdoer for the total loss.
In the South Carolina case of Jeff Hunt Machinery Co. v. South
Carolina Highway Dept.,33 plaintiff sustained damage to some road
machinery due to a defect in ferry maintained as a part of the State
highway system. After being compensated for its loss by insur-
ance, plaintiff brought an action against the Highway Department
under Section 5887 of the 1942 Code of Laws of South Carolina
(Provision now contained in Section 33-229 through 33-235 of the
1952 Code of Laws of South Carolina). The court overruled de-
fendant's contention that plaintiff was not the real party in interest,
holding that the "Real Party in Interest" statute has absolutely no
application to suits brought under Section 5887. In effect the court
has held, that in actions under Section 5887 of the 1942 Code,
the common law rule that actions must be brought in the name of
the party who sustained the loss, will apply.
UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPIZNSATION AcT
South Carolina's Workmen's Compensation Act allows the em-
ployer or his insurance carrier to be subrogated to the rights of an
injured employee, or to the rights of his dependents in case of
death, when an award for injuries has been paid. The action may
be maintained in the name of the employer's insurer, the injured
party, or, in case of death, his dependents. The damages recoverable
in such a case may exceed the award by the Industrial Commission;
but when the amount recovered is in excess of the award, the excess
will not be precluded from later maintaining a separate action against the tort-
feasor to recover the insurer's portion of the loss. The tort-feasor could
have compelled the joinder of the insurer with the insured in the action by the
insured, but not having done so, the tort-feasor can not now complain that
the cause of action has been split. Mobile Inv. Co. v. Columbia and G. Ry. Co.,
41 S.C. 40S, 22 S.E. 414, 44 Am. St. Rep. 725 (1894).
31. Mobile Ins. Co. v. Columbia and G. Ry. Co., 41 S.C. 408, 22 S.E. 414,
44 Am. St. Rep. 725 (1909).
32. 102 S.C. 348, 86 S.E. 678 (1915).
33. 217 S.C. 423, 60 S.E. 2d 859 (1950); See U. S. Casualty Co. v. State
Highway Department of South Carolina, 155 S.C. 77, 151 S.E. 887 (1930).
[Vol. 7
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For the most part our decisions in South Carolina have established
and followed a general rule as to the proper party plaintiff under
the "Real Party in Interest" statute. But when the facts were
peculiarly suited to a different or broadened rule, our court has not
adhered to an "iron clad" rule. The Lucas and Farmers Mercantile
cases are examples of such broadening. The recent South Carolina
case of Pringle v. A.C.L. Ry.8 5 offers a comprehensible review of the
South Carolina law and undoubtedly will be helpful in deciding
future cases.
FORRIST K. ABBOTT.
34. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 72-124, 72-125, and 72-422;
See Dawson v. Southern Ry. Co., 196 S.C. 34, 11 S.E. 2d 453 (1940); Elliott
v. Armour and Co., 30 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. S.C. 1939).
35. 212 S.C. 303, 47 S.E. 2d 722 (1948).
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